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Abstract. We propose a new type of self-aware systems inspired by
ideas from higher-order theories of consciousness. First, we discussed the
crucial distinction between introspection and reflexion. Then, we focus
on computational reflexion as a mechanism by which a computer pro-
gram can inspect its own code at every stage of the computation. Finally,
we provide a formal definition and a proof-of-concept implementation of
computational reflexion, viewed as an enriched form of program inter-
pretation and a way to dynamically “augment” a computational process.
Keywords: computational reflexivity, computational augmentation, self-
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1 Introduction
Self-aware computing is a recent area of computer science concerning autonomic
computing systems capable of capturing knowledge about themselves, maintain-
ing it, and using it to perform self-adaptive behaviors at runtime[1][2][3]. Almost
all self-aware systems share one or more of three properties dealt with exten-
sively in the AI literature: self-representation, self-modification, and persistence.
Examples of self-aware behaviors are the introspection and reflection features
implemented in some programming languages such as Java. Type introspection
is the ability of a program to examine the type or properties of an object at
runtime, while reflection3 additionally allows a program to manipulate objects
and functions at runtime.
However, neither of them have all of the above three properties. In fact,
introspection implies self-representation but not self-modification. Moreover, re-
flection is temporally-bound, since it occurs in a small portion of the program
execution. Even self-monitoring, considered as a periodic sequence of introspec-
tive events, implies persistence but not self-modification. We may wonder if
we could have a type of computational self-awareness in which persistent self-
representation and self-modification would occur simultaneously and yet being
functionally distinct.
In this paper, we address this issue and present a computational architecture
provided with this property, which we call computational reflexivity. Specifically,
3 The term reflection should not be confused with the term reflexion, which will be
discussed in Sections 2.3 and 3.
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we propose to introduce introspection and reflection at every step of the exe-
cution, enriching the interpretation loop with additional instructions aimed to
represent the program at a meta level, combine local and global information,
and perform a second-order execution. The enriched interpreter is thus capable
of running a program and, concurrently, generating and executing a correspond-
ing modified (or “augmented”) version.
This separation between “observed” (or target) and “observing” (or aug-
mented) process allows the system to perform self-modification at a virtual
level (i.e., on the augmented process). As a consequence, the system can choose
whether and when the modification should be applied to the target process.
In addition to the formal definition of computational reflexivity, we provide a
proof-of-concept prototype, implemented through the modification of a meta-
circular interpreter. It allows us to demonstrate that the proposed mechanism is
computationally feasible and even achievable with a small set of instructions.
In our definition of computational reflexivity, we have been inspired by sev-
eral concepts discussed in the literature on consciousness studies. Some of them
will be reported in the following sections. Our main source of inspiration is,
however, the notion of self-conscious reflexivity, as discussed in higher-order the-
ories of consciousness, and the attempts to describe it in neuroscientific [4] and
computational [5] terms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present
an overview of self-awareness, introspection, and reflexion in the context of both
computer science and consciousness studies. Section 3 introduces the formal
definitions of computational reflexion, and Section 4 introduces the prototype.
Finally, we present a short discussion in Section 5 and draft possible applications
and next research steps in Section 6.
2 Background
2.1 Procedural Introspection
In the context of the present work, we use the term computational introspection
to indicate a program capable of accessing itself, create a self-representation,
and manipulate it. A crucial distinction should be made between the meaning
of “knowledge” underlying the notion of “representation” and “manipulation”.
For this reason, we distinguish between procedural knowledge and declarative
knowledge, the former based on computable functions, and the latter on logical
statements. Depending on which meaning of “knowledge” is adopted, there are
two different ways to define computational introspection, called here procedural
introspection and declarative introspection, respectively.
Batali [6] claims that “introspection is the process of thinking about one’s
own thoughts and feelings. [...] To the degree that thoughts and feelings are
computational entities, computational introspection would require the ability of
a process to access and manipulate its own program and its current context” (See
Valdemir and Neto [7] on self-modifying code). In other words, computational
introspection corresponds to the ability of a program to process its own code as
data and modify it4.
By contrast, in declarative introspection, the access corresponds to the gen-
eration of a set of logical statements, while their manipulation is performed by
logical inference [8][9]. Batali [6] says that “The general idea is that a computa-
tional system (an agent preferably) embodies a theory of reasoning (or acting,
or whatever). This is what traditional Al systems are – each system embodies a
theory of reasoning in virtue of being the implementation of a program written
to encode the theory.”
As discussed by Cox [10], “From the very early days of AI, researchers have
been concerned with the issues of machine self-knowledge and introspective ca-
pabilities. Two pioneering researchers, Marvin Minsky and John McCarthy, con-
sidered these issues and put them to paper in the mid-to-late 1950s. [...] Minsky’s
[11] contention was that for a machine to adequately answer questions about the
world, including questions about itself in the world, it would have to have an ex-
ecutable model of itself. McCarthy [8] asserted that for a machine to adequately
behave intelligently it must declaratively represent its knowledge. [...] Roughly
Minsky’s proposal was procedural in nature while McCarthy’s was declarative.”
On the basis of these ideas, Stein and Barnden performed a more recent work
to enable a machine to procedurally simulate itself [12].
Interestingly, Johnson-Laird [13], inspired by Minsky, proposes a definition of
procedural introspection closer to the concept of computable function. He claims
that “Minsky’s formulation is equivalent to a Turing machine with an interpreter
that consults a complete description of itself (presumably without being able to
understand itself), whereas humans consult an imperfect and incomplete mental
model that is somehow qualitatively different.” According to Smith [14], “the
program must have access, not only to its program, but to fully articulated
descriptions of its state available for inspection and modification.” [...] Moreover,
“the program must be able to resume its operation with the modified state
information, and the continued computation must be appropriately affected by
the changes.”
Unlike the use of ‘procedural’ discussed above, actually consisting of a “declar-
ative” representation of the “procedural knowledge”, we employ the term in a
more restrictive way. Procedural introspection is here limited to program code
access and modification, without any logical modeling and inference. In this way,
we want to avoid the possible dependence of a particular declarative modeling
from the choices of the human designer, instead focusing on aspects connected
to program access and modification.
2.2 Introspection in Consciousness Studies
Historically, all the uses of the term ‘introspection’ in computer science have been
influenced by the meaning of the same term in philosophy of mind and, later
4 In this definition, we put together self-representation and self-modification and, thus,
the introspection and reflection features mentioned in Section 1.
on, neurosciences and cognitive science. In consciousness studies, introspection is
often discussed in the context of the so-called higher-order (HO) theories, based
on the assumption that there are different “levels” or “orders” of mental states.
Perceptions, emotions, and thoughts are instances of first-order mental states.
Higher-order mental states are mental states about other mental states. For
example, a thought about thinking something. Introspection is considered as “an
examination of the content of the first-order states” [15]. It is not clear, however,
if introspection itself is a high-order state or it is involved in the occurrence of
first-order states.
2.3 Self-Conscious Reflexivity
Introspection is not generally considered the main characteristic of conscious
states. In contrast, as claimed by Peters [16], “consciousness is reflexivity”, where
reflexion is the “awareness that one is perceiving”. Unlike other defining char-
acteristics, such as intentionality, reflexivity is the only one that is considered
unique to consciousness. Trautteur remarked that Damasio was the first scientist
to describe reflexion in the context of neuroscience [5]. Damasio’s definition of
reflexion (referred to by the term core self ) is reported in the following state-
ment:
– It is the process of an organism caught in the act of “representing its own
changing state as it goes about representing something else” ([4, p. 170]).
This definition is meant to be based on biological (and, thus, physicalist,
objective) terms since the term ‘representation’ here denotes specific neural pat-
terns. The next statement expresses the attempt by Trautteur to translate the
above “metaphorical” definition in computational terms:
– [It] is the process of an agent “processing its own processing while processing
an input5.”
In this version, the organism is reformulated as a computational agent and
representation as a computational process. Both the above statements present a
logical issue. We refer to it as the identity paradox. It consists of the fact that
the object and the subject of the experience are perceived as the same entity. It
is a violation of the identity principle, also detectable in other expressions used
by the same and other authors such as “presence o the self to itself” or “the
identity of the owner (of experience) and the owned” [5].
2.4 Elements of Inspiration and Informal Definition of
Computational Reflexivity
To overcome this logical contradiction, in the present research we moved the fo-
cus from identity to simultaneity. This frame shifting was inspired by Van Gulick
5 This statement is extracted from unpublished notes by Trautteur.
[17], which emphasizes the simultaneity of observed and observer: “what makes
a mental state M a conscious mental state is the fact that it is accompanied by
a simultaneous and non-inferential higher-order (i.e., meta-mental) state whose
content is that one is now in M”. The above statement triggered the insight
that reflexion can be seen as the simultaneous occurrence of two distinct and
synchronized processes. It implies three underlying assumptions in it: temporal
extension (i.e., ‘state’ means that we are dealing with processes), distinction
(i.e., we have two separate processes), and synchronicity (i.e., the two processes
are simultaneous). Because of the temporal extension, the term ‘simultaneity’
is employed here in the sense of interval simultaneity, which refers to sequences
of events [18]. Interval simultaneity does not necessarily imply, here, the simul-
taneity of the single events. Our assumption of synchronicity requires that each
step in one of the two processes must occur only after a corresponding step in
the other one. As shown in the next section, each pair of steps are part of the
same interpretation loop.
Using the second statement as a reference, we informally define computational
reflexion as the concurrent (i.e. at every step of the interpretation loop) and
synchronized execution of a computer program and manipulation of its code.
Correspondingly, an interpreter capable of performing computational reflexion
is said to be provided with computational reflexivity. This definition implies that
computational reflexivity is a characteristic of a particular class of universal
machines.
3 Formal Definition of Computational Reflexion
In this section, we provide, a step a time, all building blocks for the formal defini-
tion of computational reflexion. We assume reflexivity as a property applicable
to the execution of any computer program, instead of a property of a single
program. For this reason, it must rely on a particular type of program interpre-
tation. From the point of view of an interpreter, the execution of a program can
be reduced to a number of iterations of the same interpretation loop. We use
the term step to denote a single occurrence of the interpretation loop, despite
its internal complexity. We unravel below the definition of computational reflex-
ivity as a sequence of incremental enrichments of the interpretation loop. Each
enrichment, referred by both a textual symbol and a graphic mark, is meant to
induce a corresponding modification at the process level.
1. Lower Step and Standard Execution The original computational step
(i.e., the unmodified interpretation loop) is called here lower step, indicated by
the symbol (SL) and the graphic mark . At the process level, we call target
process the overall program execution.
2. Single Introspection and Tracing In this modified step, the interpreter
executes a local procedural introspection on the current step, returning the code of
the current instruction. It is called single introspection, indicated by the symbol
(SL, IS) and the graphic mark of the interpretation loop is . At the process
level, the system generates a trace of execution, similar to the one produced by
a debugger.
3. Single Upper Step and Mirroring The interpreter executes the in-
struction just extracted by introspection. We call it upper step, denoted by
(SL, IS , SSU ). The overall loop is graphically represented as . At the pro-
cess level, we have two identical programs simultaneously executed. We use the
term mirroring to indicate this real-time duplication of the target process.
4. Double Upper Step and Augmentation Here the interpretation loop is
enriched with two further operations: the modification of the current step of the
“mirrored program” by introduction of an additional instructions, and the next
step execution6. The term double upper step, with the symbol (SL, IS , SDU ), in-
dicates the execution of the “mirrored” instruction and the additional one. The
overall loop is graphically represented as . We call computational augmenta-
tion the modification of the interpretation loop performed so far. Correspond-
ingly, we have two simultaneous processes: the target process and the augmented
process. The latter one is based on the former but modified at the step level.
5. Double Introspection and Reflexion Now, we consider a particular
type of computational augmentation, in which the additional instruction of the
double upper step is a further operation of global procedural introspection. While
the local introspection returns the code of the current instruction of the target
program (i.e., the lower step defined above), the global introspection returns the
code of the entire target program or a subset of it. In this case, the upper step
consists of an execution of the mirrored instructions of the target program plus
additional global instructions about it. We call double introspection this type
of double upper step, and denote it by the symbol (SL, ID, SDU ). The overall
loop is represented by the graphical mark . Finally, we define computational
reflexion as the process generated by the loop composed by lower step, double
introspection and double upper step.
Table 1 summarizes the schema of all components. Each row reports the
symbolic representation, the graphical mark, and the corresponding terminol-
ogy at both step and process level. In summary, the addition of specific groups
of instructions to the interpretation loop underlies the generation of different
processes, each built on the previous one: standard execution, tracing, mirroring,
augmentation, and reflexion. Given a target process, the enriched interpreter
executed the related program and a concurrent version executed, at every step,
with its own code. Our definition of computational reflexion is thus a formal
specification of the informal one reported in Section 2.4.
6 Although a more general class of code modification is conceivable, we limit the focus
on the modification by instruction insertion. As explained in the next point, the aim
is to enrich the second process with information about the target process.
Symbol Step Components Process Creation Process
(SL) Lower Step Standard Execution Target Process
(SL, IS) + Single Introspection Tracing Execution Trace
(SL, IS , SSU ) + Single Upper Step Mirroring Mirror Process
(SL, IS , SDU ) → Double Upper Step Augmentation Augmented Process
(SL, ID, SDU ) → Double Introspection Reflexion Reflexive Process
Table 1. Different versions of the interpretation loop, with the addition of step com-
ponents, and related computational processes.
4 Prototypical Implementation
As a proof of concept of the feasibility to implement computational introspection,
as defined in the previous section, we developed a prototypical version. Specif-
ically, we employed and modified the code of a Lisp meta-circular interpreter
[19][20] (i.e., an interpreter of the Lisp programming language, implemented in
the same language), called here Lisp in Lisp. The main reason for using Lisp in
Lisp is that it is one of the simplest ways to implement a general-purpose inter-
preter. Indeed, it is a specific model of computation based on Church’s Lambda
Calculus [21,?]. As reported by McCarthy [23], “Another way to show that Lisp
was neater than Turing machines was to write a universal Lisp function and show
that it is briefer and more comprehensible than the description of a universal
Turing machine. This was the Lisp function eval [...]” The program is just a few
lines of code and the definition of its main function, eval, is based on the com-
position of a few primitive operators. The eval function is what is performing
the interpretation (or evaluation) process.
In this case, we call computational step (and, equivalently, interpretation
loop) the Lisp in Lisp execution between two next calls of the eval function.
Therefore, using the sequence of steps described in the previous section, we
modified the definition of eval adding additional function calls. For example,
the single introspection event correspond to a call of the function quote, which
returns the code of the argument (i.e. the instruction under execution). The com-
plete code of the program and applied examples of executions are free available
for research purpose
5 Discussion
The intuitions formalized in this paper are aimed to envision a new type of self-
aware systems. While almost all state-of-the-art systems are based on introspec-
tion, we propose to consider reflexion as the main aspect of self-awareness. We
could intuitively define computational reflexion as “a mechanism for making a
computational process continuously self-informed”. The expression “mechanism
of making” expresses the fact that reflexion is defined as a particular type of
interpreter. Indeed, we focused on the interpretation loop and modified it. Re-
flexion is not the property of a specific class of computer programs but, instead,
something that can be provided to any executable programs through this form
of interpretation. Through reflexion, the standard program execution (i.e., the
target process) is dynamically “reflected” into the execution of its augmented
counterpart (i.e., the reflexive process).
As explained in Section 3, each instruction of the target program is executed
twice: the first time (as sequence of lower steps) to achieve the standard execu-
tion (and generate the target process), and the second time (as sequence of upper
steps) as part of the reflexive process. In the above definition, the term “self” is
not referring to a single entity but to a couple of mutually interactive entities.
This duality between the two processes is the way we theoretically address the
identity paradox mentioned in Section 2.3.
6 Possible Applications and Future Work
The properties identified in the previous section allow us to conceive some inter-
esting uses of the reflexive augmentation of program execution. For example, we
could see the execution of the target program and the corresponding reflexive
augmentation as performed by two separate but synchronized devices. Specifi-
cally, we could have an autonomous agent (e.g. a robot in a physical environment)
and an interfaced web service implementing reflexion. Therefore, computational
reflexion could be used as a way to provide a system with a temporary “stream-
ing of self-awareness”.
The aimed next steps of our research are focused on the following aspects.
Firstly, we intend to further develop the proposed formalization and achieve pos-
sible interesting implications as formal theorems. Secondly, we aim to study the
degree to which the reflexive process should give feedback to the target process
and modify the related program. In other words, we would like to investigate
aspects of run-time “virtual” self-modification, not yet taken into account, at
this stage of the research, in our prototype.
A crucial issue is about efficiency. We need to investigate to what degree
the combination of step-level local and global introspection and corresponding
execution can be feasible performed. If the target program is sufficiently complex,
there is a limitation in the number of instructions capable of being executed along
the duration of the interpretation loop. In this case, the procedural modeling
of the target process should be optimized. Finally, we intend to investigate the
extent to which computational reflexivity could be employed to achieve a form of
self organization, using the information gathered by the step-level introspective
acts to train a self-reinforcement system.
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Appendix A: Code Description
The following integrative material is provisionally provided as appendix of the
paper. In the final version, this material will be provided in a website.
We employed the code of an interpreter of the Lisp programming language,
implemented in the same language, and called here Lisp in Lisp. Specifically,
since the term Lisp is currently used to denote an entire family of programming
languages sharing common characteristics, we tested and run the code in Com-
mon Lisp [24]. Rather than the original formulation of eval by McCarthy [22],
we adopted the simpler version by Paul Graham [20], which also found a bug in
the original version and removed it7.
In this context, we define computational step (and, equivalently, interpre-
tation loop) as the Lisp in Lisp execution between two next calls of the eval
function. Appendix 6 contains the code of the Lisp in Lisp (i.e., the eval. func-
tion) and its modified version (called eval-augment) implementing reflexion.
Appendix B: Components of Computational Reflexion
In the same way proceeded in the previous section, we focused on the interpre-
tation loop and gradually enriched to obtain the version implementing compu-
tational reflexion.
1. Lower Step. It is equivalent to the interpretation loop defined above.
2. Single (Local) Introspection. The current eval call returns the code
of the current instruction, consisting of a function call.
3. Single Upper Step. The code of the current function call, produced by
the local introspection, is in turn executed (i.e. eval is called on it).
4. Double Upper Step. The code generated by local introspection is en-
riched with additional instructions. As an example, we added a print call
to the output of the current call. In this way, the interpreter will display on
the terminal the trace of execution.
7 We have found a small bug in Graham’s code as well. In the definition body of
the <pair.> function, there is a call to the <list> function, which is a system
function. Since the set of primitive operators should not include <list>, we defined
the function <list.> and used it to replace all the occurrences of <list> in the
definition body of<pair.> In this note, we rounded the function names with angular
parenthesis to separate them more clearly from the rest of the text.
5. Double Introspection. Finally, the interpretation loop is enriched with
the instruction for global introspection. In other words, it returns the code
of the entire program.
In summary, at any stage of the computation, the interpreter accesses and
executes the code both locally and globally. In particular, the program code
could be modified at each step and, thus, influence the next execution.
As a specific example, Appendix 7 shows the Lisp definition of the function
my-last, which gets a list as input and returns its last element as output.
Appendix C: Lisp Code
The code of the function eval. corresponds to the version of the Lisp in Lisp
by Paul Graham [20]. We modified it and defined eval-augment, as a proof-of-
concept version of the reflexive interpreter, with the following instruction:
(augment input output pred).
The function augment applies the predicate pred to the input and output
of the current step. The specific implementation of pred in this example is
*pred*, which extract the code of the current instruction and execute it again,
thus performing the “mirroring” discussed in Section 3 of the paper.
(defun eval . ( e a )
(cond
( (atom e ) ( assoc . e a ) )
( (atom ( car e ) )
(cond
( ( eq ( car e ) ’ quote ) ( cadr e ) )
( ( eq ( car e ) ’atom) (atom ( eval . ( cadr e ) a ) ) )
( ( eq ( car e ) ’eq ) (eq ( eval . ( cadr e ) a )
( eval . ( caddr e ) a ) ) )
( ( eq ( car e ) ’ car ) ( car ( eval . ( cadr e ) a ) ) )
( ( eq ( car e ) ’ cdr ) ( cdr ( eval . ( cadr e ) a ) ) )
( ( eq ( car e ) ’cons ) (cons ( eval . ( cadr e ) a )
( eval . ( caddr e ) a ) ) )
( ( eq ( car e ) ’cond) ( evcon . ( cdr e ) a ) )
( ’ t ( eval . (cons ( assoc . ( car e ) a )
( cdr e ) )
a ) ) ) )
( ( eq ( caar e ) ’ l a b e l )
( eval . (cons ( caddar e ) ( cdr e ) )
(cons ( l i s t . ( cadar e ) ( car e ) ) a ) ) )
( ( eq ( caar e ) ’ lambda )
( eval . ( caddar e )
(append . ( pa i r . ( cadar e ) ( e v l i s . ( cdr e ) a ) )
a ) ) ) ) )
(defun null . ( x )
(eq x ’ ( ) ) )
(defun and . ( x y )
(cond ( x (cond ( y ’ t ) ( ’ t ’ ( ) ) ) )
( ’ t ’ ( ) ) ) )
(defun not . ( x )
(cond ( x ’ ( ) )
( ’ t ’ t ) ) )
(defun append . ( x y )
(cond ( ( null . x ) y )
( ’ t (cons ( car x )
(append . ( cdr x ) y ) ) ) ) )
(defun l i s t . ( x y )
(cons x (cons y ’ ( ) ) ) )
(defun pa i r . ( x y )
(cond ( (and . ( null . x ) ( null . y ) ) ’ ( ) )
( (and . (not . (atom x ) ) (not . (atom y ) ) )
(cons ( l i s t . ( car x ) ( car y ) )
( pa i r . ( cdr x ) ( cdr y ) ) ) ) ) )
(defun assoc . ( x y )
(cond
( ( null . y ) ’ ( ) )
( ( eq ( caar y ) x ) ( cadar y ) )
( ’ t ( assoc . x ( cdr y ) ) ) ) )
(defun evcon . ( c a )
(cond ( ( eval . ( caar c ) a )
( eval . ( cadar c ) a ) )
( ’ t ( evcon . ( cdr c ) a ) ) ) )
(defun e v l i s . (m a )
(cond ( ( null . m) ’ ( ) )
( ’ t (cons ( eval . ( car m) a )
( e v l i s . ( cdr m) a ) ) ) ) )
(defun eval−augment ( e a pred )
( let ∗
( ( input ( l i s t e a ) )
( output
(cond
( (atom e ) ( assoc . e a ) )
( (atom ( car e ) )
(cond
( ( eq ( car e ) ’ quote ) ( cadr e ) )
( ( eq ( car e ) ’atom) (atom ( eval−augment ( cadr e ) a pred ) ) )
( ( eq ( car e ) ’eq ) (eq ( eval−augment ( cadr e ) a pred )
( eval−augment ( caddr e ) a pred ) ) )
( ( eq ( car e ) ’ car ) ( car ( eval−augment ( cadr e ) a pred ) ) )
( ( eq ( car e ) ’ cdr ) ( cdr ( eval−augment ( cadr e ) a pred ) ) )
( ( eq ( car e ) ’cons ) (cons ( eval−augment ( cadr e ) a pred )
( eval−augment ( caddr e ) a pred ) ) )
( ( eq ( car e ) ’cond) ( evcon . ( cdr e ) a ) )
( ’ t ( eval−augment (cons ( assoc . ( car e ) a )
( cdr e ) )
a pred ) ) ) )
( ( eq ( caar e ) ’ l a b e l )
( eval−augment (cons ( caddar e ) ( cdr e ) )
(cons ( l i s t . ( cadar e ) ( car e ) ) a ) pred ) )
( ( eq ( caar e ) ’ lambda )
( eval−augment ( caddar e )
(append . ( pa i r . ( cadar e ) ( e v l i s . ( cdr e ) a ) )
a ) pred ) ) ) ) )
( augment input output pred )
output ) )
(defun augment ( input output pred )
( s e tq ∗done∗ (append ∗done∗ ( l i s t ( l i s t input output ) ) ) )
( funcall pred ∗done ∗ ) )
( s e tq ∗pred∗ #’( lambda ( done )
( let ∗
( ( next ( car ( last done ) ) )
( input ( car next ) )
( e ( car input ) )
( a ( cadr input ) )
( output1 ( eval . e a ) ) )
( format t
( concatenate ’ string
( wr ite−to−str ing input ) ”˜%”
”−> ” ( write−to−str ing output1 ) ”˜%” ) )
t ) ) )
7 Appendix E: Examples of Execution
As a simple example, the function augment and the predicate *pred* are applied
to simple data (the atom a with value 1, and the function car returning the first
element of the list (a b). In particular, it is applied to the simple recursive
function my-last, returning the last element of a list.
CL−USER( 3 5 6 ) : ( eval−augment ’ a ’ ( ( a 1 ) ) ∗pred2 ∗)
1
CL−USER( 3 5 7 ) : ( eval−augment ’ a ’ ( ( a 1 ) ) ∗pred1 ∗)
(A ( (A 1 ) ) )
−> 1
1
CL−USER( 3 6 0 ) : ( eval . ’ ( car ’ ( a b ) ) n i l )
A
CL−USER( 3 6 1 ) : ( eval−augment ’ ( car ’ ( a b ) ) n i l ∗pred2 ∗)
A
CL−USER( 3 6 2 ) : ( eval−augment ’ ( car ’ ( a b ) ) n i l ∗pred1 ∗)
( ’ (A B) NIL)
−> (A B)
( (CAR ’ (A B) ) NIL)
−> A
A
CL−USER( 3 7 0 ) : ( s e tq e ’ ( my−last ’ ( a b c ) ) )
(MY−LAST ’ (A B C) )
CL−USER( 3 7 1 ) : ( s e tq a ’ (
( my−last ( l a b e l my−last
( lambda ( x )
(cond
( ( null . x ) ’ n i l )
( ( null . ( cdr x ) ) ( car x ) )
( ’ t ( my−last ( cdr x ) ) )
) ) ) )
( null . ( l a b e l null . ( lambda ( x ) (eq x n i l ) ) ) )
) )
( (MY−LAST (LABEL MY−LAST (LAMBDA (X) (COND # # #))))
(NULL. (LABEL NULL. (LAMBDA (X) (EQ X NIL ) ) ) ) )
CL−USER( 3 7 2 ) : ( eval . e a )
C
CL−USER( 3 7 3 ) : ( eval−augment e a ∗pred2 ∗)
C
CL−USER( 3 7 4 ) : ( eval−augment e a ∗pred1 ∗)
( (COND ( (NULL. X) ’NIL)
( (NULL. (CDR X) ) (CAR X) )
( ’T (MY−LAST (CDR X) ) ) )
( (X (A B C) )
(MY−LAST
(LABEL MY−LAST
(LAMBDA (X)
(COND ( (NULL. X) ’NIL)
( (NULL. (CDR X) ) (CAR X) )
( ’T (MY−LAST (CDR X) ) ) ) ) ) )
(MY−LAST
(LABEL MY−LAST
(LAMBDA (X)
(COND ( (NULL. X) ’NIL)
( (NULL. (CDR X) ) (CAR X) )
( ’T (MY−LAST (CDR X) ) ) ) ) ) )
(NULL. (LABEL NULL. (LAMBDA (X) (EQ X NIL ) ) ) ) ) )
−> C
( ( (LAMBDA (X)
(COND ( (NULL. X) ’NIL)
( (NULL. (CDR X) ) (CAR X) )
( ’T (MY−LAST (CDR X) ) ) ) )
’ (A B C) )
( (MY−LAST
(LABEL MY−LAST
(LAMBDA (X)
(COND ( (NULL. X) ’NIL)
( (NULL. (CDR X) ) (CAR X) )
( ’T (MY−LAST (CDR X) ) ) ) ) ) )
(MY−LAST
(LABEL MY−LAST
(LAMBDA (X)
(COND ( (NULL. X) ’NIL)
( (NULL. (CDR X) ) (CAR X) )
( ’T (MY−LAST (CDR X) ) ) ) ) ) )
(NULL. (LABEL NULL. (LAMBDA (X) (EQ X NIL ) ) ) ) ) )
−> C
( ( (LABEL MY−LAST
(LAMBDA (X)
(COND ( (NULL. X) ’NIL)
( (NULL. (CDR X) ) (CAR X) )
( ’T (MY−LAST (CDR X) ) ) ) ) )
’ (A B C) )
( (MY−LAST
(LABEL MY−LAST
(LAMBDA (X)
(COND ( (NULL. X) ’NIL)
( (NULL. (CDR X) ) (CAR X) )
( ’T (MY−LAST (CDR X) ) ) ) ) ) )
(NULL. (LABEL NULL. (LAMBDA (X) (EQ X NIL ) ) ) ) ) )
−> C
( (MY−LAST ’ (A B C) )
( (MY−LAST
(LABEL MY−LAST
(LAMBDA (X)
(COND ( (NULL. X) ’NIL)
( (NULL. (CDR X) ) (CAR X) )
( ’T (MY−LAST (CDR X) ) ) ) ) ) )
(NULL. (LABEL NULL. (LAMBDA (X) (EQ X NIL ) ) ) ) ) )
−> C
C
